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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
GARTH MYERS, M.D. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants John M. Payne and Stephanie Payne have 
r.r. :il.r .. 1n act ion for neol igent wrongful birth and Appellant 
"!1 •3•·1 " Pa>'n", t'1rough his father and Guardian ad Litem, John 
c.r ... 1.111'.. 1n action for wrongful life against Respondents 
··1 ···rs, M.D., ,Joseph P. Kesler, M.D., The State of Utah 
1 ... •"l"'d 1'hil•lren's Service; and the Division of Health of the 
1 ,, ' ·it 'Jt c'1. l\n::i(•llants' claims for damages are based on the 
1 ! 1 11' i•1ns that t'1ey concei•1ed and gave birth to their son, 
Michael P. Payne, relying on the ad·1ice and as:;.Jran''" .,~ ;.,. 
dents Kesler and Myers that "his child c0uld he :,,,rn '1tr·,., 
of defect or impair~ent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Motions for summary judgment ty all resoonder.ts wero 
considered by the district court. The rrot ion for srrnmar, 
judgment by responnents Myers and t\esler was oranted as to ,, 
claims by all appellants on the basis of Utah Code Annotate1 
§63-30-4 (1978). Summary judgments were also enter»d in fav,Jc 
the State of Utah Handicapped Children's Services and the 
Division of Health of the State of Utah against cippellants Jo".: 
M. Payne and Stephanie Payne on the orounds that thev ,ilJ not 
timely serve notice of claim against the State of Utah respon, 
dents pursuant to Utah Corle Annotated §63-30-12. The moti,)n ": 
summary judgment by the State of Utah responnents as to the c·'. 0 
of Michael P. Payne was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Responnents ask this Court to affirm the order or H 
District Court grant1nq respondents MyPr~'and Keslers' mot1oc 
summary judgment as to all claims bv all appDllrin~~-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
0n September 2, 1975, Matthew Payne was born to 
·~:0ll•nts John and Stephanie Payne. Within a few months after 
tl1P i1i:·tlc, the appellants detected physical ailments in the 
::Iii l·~. Matth"'w Payne was subsequently examined by both Dr. Myers 
dn~ ~r. Kesl.,r. No specific determination of the ailment was 
:r1de. 
In 1977, John and Stephanie Payne discussed the 
c,:"" 1hi1 it'/ of a second pregnancy with respondents Dr. Kesler and 
Dr. M·;ers. The aopellants expressed concern that their son 
~3tthew's disabilities might be related to a genetic disorder. In 
the fall of 1977, the respondents arranged an appointment for the 
ar?"'llants to meet with Dr. Robert Fineman, a doctor with 
expertise in genetic counseling. This appointment, however, was 
ap,,c,rencly cancelled and never rescheduled. 
On February 14, 1978, Mrs. Payne visited her obstet-
r1c1an gynecologist, Dr. R. Kent Gibbs. At that time, Dr. Gibbs 
removed ~rs. Payne's intra-uterine birth control device (IUD). 
:r~irihs Depa p. 20). For at least a month after the removal of 
110 r r11u, Mrs. Payne 11sed a contraceptive foam to prevent preg-
n.1n~·,. (<;ibbs Depa pp. 21 & 52). 
Mrs. Payne's last recorded menstrual period was May 2, 
I'• )-i, 1c;i1Jbs Depa p. 22; Tr. p. 10). On January 27, 1979, Mrs. 
1:rk ,1,1ve birt'1 to her second son, Michael P. Payne, appellant 
1 'l I !1 j -~ l'3S~. Soon after birth, Michael Payne began to develop 
''"' ~a"'' impair'llents which had appeared in his brother. An 
-3-
examination by 3 gpnnticist s'='v.<?ral ;r;nnt·i~ 1f1_-'-r·- ·ii 
birth resulted in a proba1,1e dia<in<Y;is of Pl i"..1Pu::-·,,,, . 11 ,, 
disease, a hereditarv, procire"'i·1n brain 'li·"orrl'°r. 
1980, and filecl their cor~olaint in r'~i·; 1cti•)n )n ilr<ril 'J, 
The comrlaint all1>qed only nealiqence against rr>;Don I·· 1'ec ·!· 
and Kesler. The trial court ,lrantPd LPsrondents , ...,,/Pr.-3' dn 
Keslers' motion for summary JUcla11C''lt bas1'd ,)n ·it ah r'ocl» '.nn 
§63-30-4 ( 1978). The statuto preclurios pe>rsonal liahi 111·.1 o'. 
government employee for the nF>aliqent performance of 'ii·· rl.1'1 .. 
unless the employee actF>ri or fai lF>ri to ctct throCJqh qr 1• ne:: 
gence, fraud or malice. 
Section 63-30-4 became effecti·ve on ·~arc!1 30, 19'\. 
This was clearlv before '1rs. Payne became preqnant and, a; I' 
trial court '1elcl, be for<" anv ca:1se of act ion for neql 1~PnCP '~ 
wronqful birth) coulcl have 3risen on benalf of the µar0n••. ' 
the parties agreed that the statute came into effect befoc 0 
cause of action had arisen ~or ~rongcul life on hen~lf of 
appellant, Michael P. Payne. (C:ee Tr. p. 40, l. 1-11.J 
Respondent; take the position that §63-20-4 was in 
effect he fore an·,' anrJ 111 causes of act ion for neql l<Jr>n.:" 3nci'' 
the respondents arose on heh alt of thP a.·oel lantc .. rn·i r'1·1 1· ' 
statute preclurles su1;::. aria inst_ inrii'Jl.'i Jal qov.-~rnrn1--?n ... 1~ 
absent al l~qat i0ns of frat1c1, <1L'lSS ni:->·ll l ~""'ncr-~ or Tldl i,·i.J 
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l'.;Sr>rts that §63-30-4 is constitutional and that the 
.,1 the trial court should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POHlT I 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §63-30-4 (1975) PRECLUDES 
Pl-'!lSmJA.L Lll\BILITY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE FOR 
l\r'T OR OMISSI•)N OCCURING DURING PERFORMANCE 
i)F HIS DUTIES UNLESS THE ACT WAS DUE TO GROSS 
NEGLIG~NCE, fqAUD OR MALICE. 
The appellants filed an action alleging only negligence 
a~:ci1n,t rC'spondents Kesler and Myers in their personal capacity. 
r: er" ic; w) disoute that responnents Kesler and Myers were 
·'1"pl•Y1cc"":; of the Stcite of Utah actinq within the scope of their 
E11•:il·Y/'1l'cr1t. r SeP Plaintiffs complaint, 1123). Utah Code Ann. 
~~i-in-1 as cimended in 1978, provides: 
Noth1na contained in this act unless 
sp~cificallv orovided is to be construed as 
an omission or denial of liability or 
n1sability insofar as governmental entities 
are concernen. Wherein immunity from suit is 
waived bv this act, consent to be sued is 
qranted and liability of the entity shall be 
determined as if the entity were a private 
per-son. 
The remedv aqainst a governmental entity or 
its employees for an injury caused by an act 
or omission which occurs during the 
performance of such employees duties, within 
the scone of emolovment, or under color of 
d11thorit·1 is, afte~ the effective date of 
t '1 i:; aet·, exclusive of any other civil act or 
l'C•)C'."'ding by reason of the same subject 
matter •qainst the employee or the estate of 
th0 emplovee, whose act or omission gave 
ad•1ice to the claim, unless the employee 
a··te<l or failed to act through gross 
11e·1ligence, fraud or malice. 
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An employee mav he joinPd in an action 
against a gavPrnrnental Pntit; in a 
representative capaci•v if the act or 
omission complained ,)c ls onP in 'which u,,--
governmental Antity may be liable, but n•) 
employee shall be helcl "''rsocial 1'1 l i,;;,1' ', 
acts or omissions occurlna durin~ the 
perfocmance of the emplo,1ees duties, wir 1i 11 
the scope of employment or under color of 
authority, unless it is established that rhe 
employee acted or failed to act due to arnss 
negligence, fraud or 1lalice. 
The amended statute became effective on c'lar,~ 1 , 1"l, 1c-
It is the resnondent Mver's position that §63-30-4 c]PJ-!~ 
preclLides appellants from hrinqin-1 a nealigence action a.c31 1 ;: 
respondents Kesler and ~yers in their personal capacit~ r• 1 , 
Court has analyzed this specific issue in the recent ca3e ~' 
Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). In as:...,ess i nJ 
personal liability of government employees, the court ~tat-0 l: 
The 1978 amendment to the Governmental 
Immunity Act, in §63-30-4, establishes a new 
statLJtory standard for official immunity. 
Thus, under the first quoted paragraph, the 
act's expansion of the right to sue govern-
mental entities and its permission to su~ 
governmental employees for "gross nealigence, 
fraud, or malice" is declared to be "exclu-
sive of any other civil action or proccedinq 
bv reason of the sarne subject matter aaainst 
t~e employee or the estate of the employee. 
• By this provision, ~63-30-4 precludes 
all statutorv or c.immon la'" causes of act1nn 
against an e~plovee in his or her personal 
capacity for acts or omissions whic>-i oc•~''ir 
dur1na the performance of the employees' 
duties, except a:~ a11t,v1ri. ~Ad in ~h~ nov??rn-
mental immunit1 act. 
The seconc1 y110t-ecl oara,1raoh ot )63-30-4 
reaffirms tn,1t c:ie 0rnol<)v0e ·,.;111 not he 
personall'! liac)le unl, 0 ss he or ;he a.~t-_Pd '" 
failed to act duP to qross nealioenc"', fr311.i 
or 11alicP. [65R P.2d at ~~3 tfootnot · 
omitted, ernpha:~i:o adcled)]. 
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Thus, it is clear that if the provisions of §63-30-4 as 
,,,,,] in 1978, are applicable to the facts in this case, the 
n ~,111 111~ <>f the motion for summary judqment in favor of respon-
.1. nt; Kesl·•r and 'lyers was proper. Appellants argue, however, 
L:c>t th,c1 r cause of action arose prior to the date §63-30-4 
1~c•me effective. As will be set forth below, appellants' cause 
,,f act i.1n did not arise until after March 30, 1978, and is 
suh]ect •o the provisions of the statute. Respondents Kesler and 
~yers cannot he sued in their personal capacity because §63-30-4 
precludes personal liability of government employees for acts or 
omissions occurinq durinq the performance of their duties, unless 
the employees "acted or failed to act, throuqh gross neqligence, 
fraud or malice." Since plaintiffs' complaint makes no such 
Allegation, the granting of summary judgment as to respondents 
Kesl~r and Myers was proper. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS' CLAIMS AGAINST RESPONDENTS DID 
NOT ARISE UNTIL AFTER §63-30-4 BECAME 
EFFECTIVE AND, THEREFORE, ARE BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE. 
A. All the Elements of a Negliqence Action 
Must Exist Before a Cause of Action Can Arise. 
The elements of actionable negligence are: ( 1) A legal 
L• t « h\' one person to another, ( 2) a breach of th at duty, 
{ ! damaq•• proximately resulting from such breach. All the 
"l•"•n""' rnllst co-exist before there can be any recovery. 
11,><lti 1'"~" ,_ r'3rson, 519 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex.Civ.App. 1975); 
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Hunter v. Knioht, Vale <. (;u•oor?, 18 i·iash.:\pp. 64n, 
215 ( 1977) (negliqence action arises when all Plement~ 
to maintenance of a law suit are present.) 
v. Cokayne, 646 P.2d 747 (Utah 19S2); Industrial <on1m'n of·;. 
v. Wasatch Gradino Co., 14 P. 2d 98H, 992-993, (Utah 193~;. 
Thus, the q en er a 1 r u 1 e is that u n 1 es s the o 1 a i n • 1 '' 
sustained injury, ther~ is no cause of action for a claim 
sounding in negligence. See P.g. Bonano v. D0tthoff, S:' 1.c 
561, 564 (N.D.Ill. 1981) (under Illinois law, no cause ot 3 :· 
for neq 1 igence unt i 1 t'ie inJ ury or damage has occurrerl-atto~o· 
malpractice acti)n); Royal Crown flottlinq, Etc. v. l\etna ··3, 
& Sur. Co., 438 F.Su::or. 39, 44-45 ('"l.D.Okl. 197'7) inle ir 
Oklahoma is that a negligence action may not he maintained y. 
and until the plaintiff has sustained in1ury, because "inJ" 
an essential element of the claim"); Doyle v. Lynn, 547 P.2ri 
257, 259 (Colo.App. 1975) (without damage, there is no caus1• 
action on claim based on negligence; Romano v. Westinqhnuse 
Co., 336 A.2d 555, 559 (R.I. 1975) (proof of actual damages i· 
essential part of plainti~f's case and negligence action); :r. 
Paul Mueller Co. •r. Cache '!alley Dairy Ass 'n, 657 P. 2d 127Y, 
(Utah 1982). 
General principles which ordinarily govern in n°1' 
gence also apply in medical malpractice cases. 
36 Md.App. 633, 375 A.:'d 1138, 1147 (1977). Thus, to pr 
case in medical malpractice the plaintiff has the ourden o~ 
proving that the r:ihysician was n'"'liqent in fai linq tn ·ice 
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, ,, care> ancl that the failure to use ordinary care was the 
•. ,,,. c·ause of plaintiff's injury. Conrad v. St. Clair, 100 
id'"'"' 401, S99 P.2d 292, 295 (1979); Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 
'.4d, 'lS4 ('Jtah 1980). 
It is the apoellants' contention that their claim and 
'r"· n"'ol i•1P11ce hcid fully matured prior to March 30, 1978, the date 
amP~ied ~~!-10-4 became effective. The respondents vigorously 
rli·~1Jutr: t-!11'.~ assertion. The respondents recognize that if a 
phj"'1cian-patient relationship existed between Mrs. Payne and 
Or-:. Keslcer and :·1:,ors, then a duty existed. Respondents will 
al~o acknowledge, for the sake of argument, that if their action 
rell below the standard of care exercised by physicians of 
similar training in similar locals, there may be a breach of the 
J.t; owced to Mrs. Payne. The respondents, however, contend 
u1wqui•1ocallv that whatever injur~· was sustained by the alleged 
breach of the duty owned to Mrs. Payne did not occur until Mrs. 
Pa·,11e hecamt> preonant, a time clearly after March 30, 1978. 
B. Claims of Any Appellant Against Respon-
dents Kesler and Myers D1d Not Arise 
Until Mrs. Payne Became Pregnant. 
All the parties agree the statute became effective 
hc>I "' c i ea,1se of action accruea on behalf of the appellant, 
·'t I P.1yn•'· (See Tr. p. 40, 1. 1-13.) The appellants argue, 
'""-· that John and St~phanie Payne, acting in reliance on the 
i•, .. ,,.,1 ne'lliqent advise of respondents Kesler and Myers, had 
~r~. Pavne's IUD removed, ana, thus incurred some medical 
•·xp<'nS"". The ap:i<>l lants assert that this expense constituted an 
-9-
"injury" which gave rise to their claim againo~t. th» ,- .... :i, 1 nd"· 
As a matter of law, this cont>'ntion is incorrect. 
As was noted above, the general rrinciples ,,,, 1 ,·;· 
ordinarily govern in negligence actions also appl~ in ~0 ~i:· 
malpractice cases. Riffey v. Conder, sun L~; Nixdorf v. fi 1 -
A brief review of the case law and legal commentar; 
dealing with the accrual of a neali·1enr" 1~ause of act ion wi:' 
demonstrate that the so-c.1llerl injury, by the aprel lanls ·,1as 
sufficient to sustain a cause of action for "wronc1ful birt~.· 
is "wrongful birth" which is John and Stephanie Payne's cau;" 
action against the respondents, and is the parents equival•1 
the child's claim for "wrongfJl life." See general lC', Rodoer' 
Wrongful Life and Wronqf•-11 Girth: Medical r1alpractic" in Gece• 
Counseling and Pre-Natal Testina, 33 S.C.L.R.ev. 713 (198:'1. 
Sorr.e medical rnalpract ice cases hold that a c1qse of 
action arises when an inJur1 is sustained by the plaintiff, n~· 
when the causes are set in motion which ultimately pro<luc~ 1°· 
as a consequence. Ayers 'J. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 780, 
790 (1959) (citing Foley ·1. Pittshurg Des Moines Co., 3~3 ?J. 
6 8 A • 2d 5 1 7 ( 1 9 4 9 ) ) • "The injury is done when the act heralcr· 
a possible tort inflicts dcirnaqe which is physic.1lly obiecu·;e 
ascertainable." Ayers v. '1oraan, s•JDra at 792. 
It is impor·tant to not" t'1at the mere L1ct .1 •.111ysic 1 
is mistaken in a <liaonosis is nnt sufficient, standin,1 ~11( 11 '' 
warrant a findina of negligence. 
579, 586 (N.D. 1979); 1orne v. Rrumfir>lrl, 'lfl3 So.2'1 7g, Rl 
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Rather, "[c]onclusive proof of a doctor's 
1 I 1 wrw" will not of itself support a malpractice action. 
"1 laintiff must also show that such negligence was a proximate 
c", "c 1)f the injury." Voeqeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 94 (8th 
,~ir. 1977). 
T~us, no medical malpractice action arises until injury 
It is at this point that a plaintiff's cause of 
action is complete and legally cognizable. "Where a physician 
n,~1 l iqent ly diagnosis a case, he is not liable unless injury 
follows as a result of such negligence." Seattle-First National 
Bank v. Rankin, 367 P.2d 835, 840 (Wash. 1962). 
Case law from the area of legal malpractice is also 
instri1cti•;e. In Veseley Otto Miller' Keefe v. Blake, 311 NW.2d 
3 l'-lu.n. 1981), a lawyer sought contribution from a doctor after 
thP lawyer had been found liable for malpractice for failing to 
~·l•Jicc~ a client about the two-year statute of limitations claim 
aq1in~t the noctor. In denying the lawyer's claim for con-
tribution, the court stated: 
When Dr. Blake allegedly treated John 
Togstean in a negligent manner, Todstead 
could have sued him for damaqes for personal 
injuries arising from medical malpractice at 
that time and throughout the two-year statute 
of limitations. However, the Togsteads could 
not have sued appellants for negligent legal 
advice during this two-year period because at 
•his point they had suffered no damage 
arisina from the legal malpractice. The 
Taqstean's ability to appellants for damages 
arose only at the time, and indeed for the 
very reason, that thev could no longer sue 
Dr. Rlake, i.e. at the expiration of a 
limitations for the medical malpractice 
c\.1im. [311 NW.2d at 5]. 
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Similarl/, in RC>li3nce In. 
604 (!linn. 1982), the Mi'.1nesota Supreme Co11rc ~ua1n '1el'1 ,, .. -
lawyer was not ne9ligent .1s a rnatter nf law for mal;iract 1,. 
his acts or omissions resulted in dama-1c t0 111s cl1c>nt, bee.;, 
of the expiration of the Statute 0f ~imit3ci1ns. 
that damage is an essential Plement of a negligence causP n' 
action, and that "the threat of future harm, not yet realizea, 
will not satisf/ the damage requirement." 322 NA. 2d at iiU7. 
Thus, the clieni: 's right to sue f.1n legal malpractice does r. 
accrue when the client incurs a financial obligation to the 
lawyer, but only when the final act directly leading t0 the 
actual damage is consummated. 
A sirnilar line of reasoning was appliec:l hy the cour 
Bonanno v. Potthoff, 527 !7.Supp. 561 ('J.D.Ill. 19811. 
case, a client brought a malpractice action against his attor--
after the attorney negl~gently failed to file his ap1karcne 0 
litigation broughc by the client. A subsequent action file~ 
identical grounds to those 0f the original action was also 
dismissed on a res judicata decision. The court held that 
plaintiff's cause of action dU1 not ari"e until the secund •' 1 
was dismissed by the ·rial court and this dismissal was up" 0 '.-
the appellate court. The court stated: "Inrleed, tfie foree 0 1 
analysis is supported by case law indicatinq t11at 2-2111 
against Pott'.1off before the ao1Jellate crn1rt ,Jeci·;1on ni,1~: 
have been dis~isse~ as pr~rn3turP. 11 527 F'.Supp. at Sfi5 (e'11PC1J 
added l. See also Walk~r v. Pacific Ind0m. Co., 6 Cal.Rptr. 
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,.,,, IH' <'cil.App.2d 513, 517 (1960) (probability that event 
111'1 .-11m,v1P will result from wrongful act does not render act 
The appellants, therefore, could not have brought a 
·.vr .. nc1ful birth action when they allegeclly received assurances 
f• thP resonndents that a second child would be healthy. Nor 
'01lld apf)Pllants hav<" brought suit for wrongful birth when they 
io_-.ir•P·l the nnminal cost of the office visit to Dr. Gibbs. A 
suit tor wronuful birth, at that time, would clearly have been 
prEmaturP. As the court succinctly states in Alhino v. Starr, 
169 Cal.Rpt. 136, 147, 112 Cal.App.3d 158, 176 (1980): 
If the allegedly negligent conduct cloes not 
cause damage, it generates no cause of action 
and tort. The mere breach of a professional 
duty, causing only nominal damages, 
speculative harm-not yet realized-does not 
suffice or create a cause of action for 
ne1liqence. 
Even supposing that the office visit of Mrs. Payne to 
Dr. ~1rns 1n February of 1973 is cognizable as an injury to the 
appellants, when viewed in the context of a negligence claim for 
,;r1)n·1ful birth this would be "nominal damages, speculative 
~1 Li r ,n-nut yet rea 1 i zed. Such a claim of injury, standing 
3 I ,,,~ is not sufficient to support a nealigence action for 
'11 hirth. See Repp v. Bahn, 45 Or.App. 671, 609 P.2d 398, 
"'':'- lU I ( 1 ~80) (doctors' erroneous diagnosis of scalp condition, 
,.,-, I .1f ·'r J ,,,J to cancer, was not act ionahle harm at time of 
It is only at the time when Mrs. Payne becomes 
c:ir 10 ·111.,-11 ti1.1t a cause of action possibly begins to arise. 
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Indeeci, given the fact that ~hP di.::~asc that 1nrcl l 3n1 "1i 
Payne suffers from only ncc1rs in ;r . .Jle.c, it is arqtJahb? 1-.,-
1 
in time durin·1 the pregnanc'/ in which 1t h'Ould be 90ssi:-,1rl 
determine the sex of the chi lrl ,'.Jr e'Jen if tne child was 3 ,,,,,_ 
from th 0 disease. Cf. Foil v. Rallina"r, 601 P.2rl 144 1''• 0 • 
1979) (statute of limitations of Healt1 Care '1alpractice Ac• 
begins to run when inj•Jred (Jerson knows or sho•.ilcl knoi; t'1'' 
has suffered leaal injury). 
The question is when clo the plaintiffs have a Je1al_ 
cognizable claim for an action for wrongful birth. The ans· ... ·.: 
they did not have a legally cognizable claim at anv time µr 
t(,e conception of "1ichael Payne, which was clearly after 'f·-' 
became effective. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts S30, pp. 1;:_, 
(4th Ed. 1971), agrees with this conclusion: 
Since the action for negligence developerl 
chieflv out of the olJ forms of action on the 
case, it retained the rule of that action, 
that proof of damage was an essential part of 
the plaintiffs' case. Nominal damages, to 
indicate a technical r1aht, cannot he 
recovered in a neulia 0 nce action where no 
actual loss has occurrerl. The tnreat of 
future har:n, not yet realized, is not eno11qh. 
Negligent conduct in itself is not such an 
interference with the intcr<0st ,,f the world 
at larqe that there is an/ rinht to comrl~in 
of it . 
The record i~ clear that ~rs. Payne's last rnens 1 c 
period was in "lay of 1978. (S<ee Tr. p. 10). Th is ' . .Ja::_; al ro: 
date when §~3-30-4 became effective. 
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Th"' Payne's action for wrongful birth, sounding in 
d1·1 n<)t 3rise until '1rs. Pavne became pregnant, well 
time §~3-30-4 became operative. A claim for wronaf ul 
''ll If; r1or to this time would have been premature. The appel-
.. 1 "in J llr ices," the supposed charge for removal of Mrs. 
'cJ\'ne:>''~ ir1'), is not even listed in Dr. Gibbs' financial account 
(See Gibbs Depo, Exhibit "A"). The 
_I ,,q.c -- l 1 ;tprl for 1978 are for a pap smear and a routine office 
"t•;it. Th0rc' is no charae for the removal of the IUD. The 
<•r eo-1nan-·v is charged in one lu11p sum on January 28, 1979, in the 
.J•n· :nt .,,- S q5. 00. (See Gibbs Depo, Exhibit "A"). Thus, if the 
"inJ•ir::" is the financial obligation incurred from the removal of 
r_l;e 11 10, it is arguable they suffered no injury until the 
'' l 11-1t i•'n ari11eared in the financial statement of Dr. Gibbs in 
I 'J~ 9. 
Conceding, however, for the sake of argument, that the 
""'''- f ,-,,,n the removal of the IUD was a separate charge that was 
incurred by the plaintiffs at the time of the February, 1978 
··f"i·'~ 'li;it to Dr. Gibbs, the issue of whether a cause of action 
'" ·..i1·1rnq•u1 birth had arisen can be resolved only one way: No 
"''• ,o-• i·•n ·,;as sustainable at that time. The appellants, having 
time prior to Mrs. Payne's becoming preanant, would 
11 .ont it: led to recover only nominal damages-an indication 
•
1 1ni,'-1l right which cannot be recovered in a negligence 
t i 1- 'Wh"r" nu actual harm is incurred. Prosser, supra. See 
3! --~'I. 1·'LitH,, Limit3t-ions on Actions 11 (1959). 
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Section 63-30-4 ;:ir,~clu::les p,orsonal liah1 l ir~r fr,. 
government employc>es unless they act or fai 1 to act r!1r'"''"' 
neoligence, fraud or malice, an:i beca:ne effrocr ive 'larc·r 'i,, 
The plaintiffs filer'l an action alle>qinq only neql iqence d'!.i,· 
respondents Kesler ancl Myers in their [>ersonal capacity. Th' 
plaintiffs cause of action [or wronqful birth accrried onb r 
time Mrs. Payne became pregnant, sometime at the end of Apri: 
early May, 1978. Section 63-30-4 thus precludes any cause of 
action aqainst respondents Kesler and Myers and the qrant1no 
summary judgment as to those respondents was proper. 
POINT III 
WRITING REQUIRSD AS BASIS FOR LIARILITY 
FOR BREACH OF ASSIJRANCE OF RESULT. 
The gist of appc!llant 's complaint is that they coo-
ceived and gave birth to appellant Michael Payne "relying u~· 
the advice and assurance of rlefendants Gcirth G. Myers and Jose· 
P. Kesler that a second c~ild could be horn without fear of 
defect or impairment." (Plaintiffs' Complaint, ~15.) ~ 
Ann. ~78-14-6 ( 1976) exprrossly provides: 
No liability shall be imposerl upon any health 
care provider on the basis of an alleqed 
breach of quarantee, warrdnty, contract or 
assurance of result to he obtained from anv 
health care cend~ren 1 1nle>ss the guarantP~~, 
warrant'!, co11tract or assur3nc2 as s~t For~~ 
in writing and siqned by the health care 
provirler or an authorized aoent of the 
provicler. 
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There is no written document signed by respondent which 
,,, ",,~ th0 appellants that a second child could be born without 
" ,r defect or impairment. Indeed, neither John Payne nor 
5'"nhanin Payne could place a specific date for the visit during 
wh1ch thPy allegedly received the oral assurances. (Brief of 
AcnPLlant at 14.) 
Although not raised by the parties at the hearing for 
su~rnar; iudqrnent, the statute is dispositive of appellant's 
cl 31,ns and its application is supported by the record before this 
co~r•. Although the appellants may not raise such a contention 
for the first time on appeal, the respondent may urge any point 
reflectPd hy the record in support of its judgment in the 
appellate process. Soencer v. Communitv Hospital of Evanston, 87 
Ill.App.3d 214, 408 NE 2d 981, 985 (1980). See also Fuller v. 
Favor~tP Theater Co., 230 P.2d 335 (Utah 1951) (ordinarily 
respondent may urge any matter appearing in record in support of 
judgrnPnt appealed from); Adams v. Liedholt, 38 Colo.App. 463, 536 
P.2d Vi, aff'd 579 P.2d 618 (1976). 
It is clearly reflected in the record that the appel-
la111; rPceived only oral assurances. (Brief for appellant at 14; 
Tr-. at p.13, l. 12.) Appellants have produced no written 
,j,, ·urnents signed by respondents. The statute is clear that the 
' ,' i: 1 t J of any heal th care provider for any breach of an 
c'" lrll''" of result is contingent upon a writing so stating and 
'i ic1nd hy thP he,;lth care provider. The legal consequences of 
ti"" -;t -it ,1t1' Pxrressly support and affirm the trial court's 
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qrantina of the summary judarc,nt a.> to re:;"•1nd•'nt·; K··~L· 
Myers. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANTS' ALLFGATIONS ,\RE NOT SU?PURTCD BY THE 
RECORD BEFQRE THE COURT. 
It is tlw responsihilitv of the appell onts c.n f,Jrc, 
this Supreme Court wit'1 the :ir•'cise recorrl consiclered r'':' t::e 
trial court in orrler for the Surr~11e ·~nurt to :nooerl-_: re":' 
error directerl to grantina a motion for summary juda11ent. 
Jacobsen v. State, 89 Wash.?d 104, 569 P.2rl 1152, 1157. 119--
The burden on the party alleqinq error is to show it affir~o-
tively in the recorr1, an:l t'ie a;1sence of s1ich an affir:not'.'i·' 
record to support the apoell3nt 's contention wi 11 result in'. -
reviewing court's refusal to consir1er thP cilleqed errnr. ''''' 
v. Walker, 139 Ga.App. 145, 227 SE.2d q20, 921 (1976). S0 0: 
Schranz 11. I. L. Grossman, Inc., 90 Ill.App.3d 507, 412 'lE,:: 
1378, 1383 (1980) (where record is lacking, reviewing court,; 
indulge every presumption favorable to judgment or order appe• 
from); Cook v. Hahn, 403 NC.2rl 834, 1337 (Ind.Ap;:i. 1980) (·•~e' 
error is alleqed but not disclosed by the recorcl, such ecrut 
not proper subject for revi»w by the court); Coooer v._~":,':".:.· 
610 Si•l.2d 825, 828 (Tex.Ci'J.l'\pp. 1980\ (If .'lf1[1ellant hrin1• 
insufficient record, every rPason~b1~ nc0su~0ti0n will 
indulged in favor of ruli~~ helow, and a reversal will ,nr 
orderecl unles.'3 it appears that: on no pnssihl1: c;tate of t:"" ,·J.-
could the ruling he uphelrl). 
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It is respondent's firm contention that the record 
nre I h•; aprwllants on appeal is insufficient to support a 
,... . .c.11 ,,f lhe trial court's summary judgment. The record 
1nn·1~ts of all memorandum filed in support or in opposition of 
lne rnntion for summary judgment, the appellants' complaint and the 
responrlent's answers and amended answers, and the deposition of 
rr. R. KPnt Gibbs and attached exhibits. 
rrucial to appellants claimed basis for reversal of the 
surnmarv judgment are the allegations that appellants incurred 
immediate money damages as a result of the removal of Mrs. 
Payne's IUD at the February, 1978 office visit. Equally vital to 
appellants claim is the assertion that the IUD was removed for 
the express purpose of having a child. Yet neither of these 
Jssertions have a concrete basis in the record before the court. 
Dr Gibbs' financial statement shows no direct line-charge for 
t~e cernoval of the IUD. (See Gibbs Depo, Exhibit "A"). Appel-
!ants merely assert-and provide no substantiation in the record-
that the IUD removal was included in the eventual, general 
pteondncy hill set down on January 28, 1979. 
A0 ain, appellants assert-but provide no substantiation 
in tl1c rc'cord-that Mrs. Payne sought to have her IUD removed 
·tr·, ' " the [)urpose of conceiving a child. Yet the only record 
,. t 11•'" enurt relating to Mrs. Payne's state of mind at this 
1 1 c0 , the t1el)0sition of her gynecolo')ist, Dr. Gibbs, reveals no 
lir··~"t 'tatr•mPnts to this effect. (See Gibbs Depa., pp. 20-21). 
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It is r0snnndent 1 s rJ0;:11-1(J:1. t-hd~ 1:J:)r'1l3nt,-
JI I;_ 
to support their cldi;n ,'3s t() tl;e r~'Jf":-.--;al 1t- thP ~t 1 .3 ;_ ,~,): 
orcler granting summarv ju<lqmerir_. The ~rux of aooell~nt dl 
is that they suffered iniurc' prior to t 11P <'fC"°'Cti'JC. onactJl'C' 
§63-30-4. Ap;iellants provide no dir<"ct <0videnc<" 0f this b0 , 
assertion in the recorcl of appeal. 
failed to suhstantiate thP basis of t'1eir clai'lls, this .-0ur 
shoulcl indulge every nresumotion favorahle to the judoment 
trial court. Sc~ranz 1;. I.L. Grossman, Inc., supra; C000P: _ 
Bowser, supra. The trial cour:: 's order oranting surimary l"'' 
as to respondents Kesler and i~evers should be reaffir'!led. 
POINT V 
PUBLIC POLICY IN U~AH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE WRONGF~t 
LIFE OR WRO'l<~Fl 1 L cir;nH C.\USE OF 'ICTION. 
It is the expr<0ss puhl ic pol icy of the State of Utah n·" 
recognize any cause of action for wrongful life or wrongful 
birth. Ut3h Code Annotat<0cl 1)78-11-23 ( 1983), states: "The 
legislature finrls and declarf>s that it is the puhlic polic:-' 
this state to encouraci 0 all persons to rf>spect t~e riqht t• 1 
of all other persons, re~arjless of age, dc»;elopment, con''·' 
or rlependencv, inclJClin:i all l1andican,1erl p~rsons and all ,,r· 
per:;ons." Utah lorle .\nn. t)78-11-24 ( 1Y83), stat PS: "A C'c-l: 
be11alf of anv ?·~rson, hased on the claim thcit rJLit fnr th~'" 
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,if cJnotl1er, a person would not have been permitted to 
, " 
1 111rn 1liv<", but would have heen aborted." 
F<0 s1mndents do not ask this court to apply the statutf'>S 
1,'~ i_1-'~~J;.· to this case. Respondents argue, howevf'>r, that the 
µ is clearly indicative of what has heen and what :s the 
,,e,]1C' fl''licy in the State of Utah regarrling the cause of action 
', , .. "'r1)thl r rl 1 i fe or wrongful birth, and what is the general 
fl' lie policy of the United States with regard to such causes of 
Jct l•ln. \ survey of the general cas<" law reveals that claims for 
,,r ,,,,qf 1,ll Ii fe hav<" been rejecterl in an overwhelrninq majority of 
tl1t• cac·Pci. In Phillins v. United States, 508 F.Supp. 537 (O.S.C. 
lqH1\, t~e cnurt considered South Carolina's first claim of 
In its exhaustive review of other juris-
d1,·• inns, t~e court found an "overwhelming majority of those 
cas<>~ 'iave refused to t:f'>cognize the validity of 'wcongful life' 
d1ims." 508 r'.Supr. at 541. Only three courts have recognized 
s11ct 1 ,..... l ci j ins: 
1..Jas~11ngton. 
One in New Yock, one in Califocnia and one in 
Most significantly, the New York case has been 
r'"'"rsed, Beckec v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 595, 
~!.F.2rl 807 (1978), and the California case has been soundly 
rw '1"1't<e·1 a·> "un~ounrl undec established principles of law" and as 
.,,, "·,~,•t inJ cit least an unwise jucisprudential example which we 
"' '" '" [11llow." Turpin v. Sortini, 174 Cal.Rpt. 128, 129, 
1l'11. 
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Respondents arque that the appellants' claim for 
"wrongful life" and "wrongful hirth" should be rejecterl for 
following reasons. First, such claims cleal'."ly contravine ''• 
pro-life public policy of Utah. These claims are cleal'."lJ 
enigma in the law better lc,ft to the state legislatures. Sec 
damages for such clai;ns can only be made on a highly-s!'e~ull'. 
basis. Buhrman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). 
Finally, defendant submits that an infant has no legally cogr: 
able right to be born without birth defects. Becker v. Schwar·. 
supra at 812. As a result of these complex and essentially 
metaphysical problems, most courts have rejected entil'."ely a~ 
claim for wrongful life. Respondents urge that the complexit, 
the issues involved mandate a rejection of the claim for wror.c 
life and wrongful birth. 
CONCLUSION 
ThP trial court's summary judgmerit clismissing appel-
lants' claims against the respondents Myers ancl Kesler should: 
affirmecl. Appellants claim that their cause of action arose 
prior to the date on which §63-30-4 became effective is wit~oc: 
merit. The appellants si'11ply did not have a legally coqnizat> 
claim until that point in time in which Mrs. Payne became 
pregnant. Mrs. Payne did not become iJl'."Pqnant until well aftec 
§63-30-4 became effecti-;e and as sucl-t, ariy claims aoain;t 1· 1 -
respondents in their personal caracity al'."e barrecl by the 0taL 
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Th1s is not a case of a retroactive application of a 
,,; ,Jt P Lu extinquish a vested right. The appellants had no 
, ~,,, , ,,f 1ctic)n prior to Mrs. Payne's becoming pregnant. Any 
''~im prior to this point would have been premature. All the 
P]emcnts necessary for a negligence action must co-exist before 
that action is cognizable at law. Duty, breach of duty, a causal 
rplationship, and injury must all exist before a negligence cause 
of action can arise. Nominal damages will not suffice. 
Further, appellants' claim is phrased in the ter-
minology of assurance of result. Utah Code Ann. S78-14-6 clearly 
states that no liability shall be imposed upon any health care 
provider on the basis of a breach of an assurance of result 
unless such assurance is in a writing signed by the health care 
provider. No such writing was alleged or produced by the appel-
lants in this case. The statute thus stands as an additional and 
,Ji,~positive bar to appellants claims. 
Additionally, appellants have not provided a sufficient 
record to substantiate their claims of error in the court below. 
Lastlv, and perhaps most importantly, it is clearly the public 
~1l1cy of Utah not to recognize causes of action for wrongful 
Ji(µ or wrongful birth. 
Respondents also deny the appellants contention that 
';h J-111-1 ic; unconstitutional and incorporate by reference the 
,, 111 1111"11 ; 1J( the Respondent Kesler as to the constitutionality 
"",i ;1"1nJn1•ss of the statute. In light of all these factors, the 
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